

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/PV.330  
14 September 1967  
ENGLISH

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTIETH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 14 September 1967, at 10.30 a.m.

THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

NOV 29 1967

DOCUMENT  
COLLECTION

Chairman:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI (India)

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## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:  
Mr. A.F. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA  
Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES  
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:  
Mr. K. CHRISTOV  
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV  
Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Burma:  
U KYAW MIN

Canada:  
Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. J.R. MORDEN  
Mr. A. BERNIER

Czechoslovakia:  
Mr. P. WINKLER  
Mr. V. VAJNAR  
Mr. J. STRUCKA

Ethiopa:  
Mr. A. ZELLEKE  
Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:  
Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI  
Mr. N. KRISHNAN  
Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:  
Mr. R. CARACCILO  
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI  
Mr. E. FRANCO  
Mr. F. SCRO

Mexico:  
Mr. J. CASTANEDA  
Miss E. AGUIRRE

Nigeria:  
Alhaji SULE KOLO

Poland:  
Mr. J. GOLDBLAT  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Romania:

Mr. N. ECOBESCO  
Mr. O. IONESCO  
Mr. C. GEORGESCO  
Mr. A. COROIANU

Sweden:

Mr. A. EDELSTAM  
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN  
Mr. M.V. ANTYASOV  
Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALILAF  
Mr. A. OSMAN

United Kingdom:

Sir Harold BEELEY  
Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER  
Mr. A.S. FISHER  
Mr. S. DePALMA  
Mr. G. BUNN

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (India): I declare open the 330th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.
2. I should like to welcome our old friend Mr. Adrian Fisher to our midst, and to express the hope that Mr. Foster, one of our co-Chairmen, will after so many years be able to have at least a few days of rest. We wish Mr. Foster bon voyage and we hope that he will come back to us soon. Mr. Fisher is known to all of us. In fact, when I first came to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament he was the representative of the United States, and I have very pleasant memories of close and fruitful association with him. I trust that we shall all continue that close association.
3. Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your welcome to my colleague Mr. Fisher. I appreciate also your kind words and good wishes to me. Since you have introduced Mr. Fisher, I should like to take advantage of this opportunity to mention Mr. Samuel DePalma, who is the Assistant Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and who, as many representatives know, has been associated with us here on a number of occasions. I am sure that the Committee will give them the same co-operation and assistance as it has given me and my present deputy, Mr. George Bunn, who will also be leaving this week-end.
4. Today I should like to describe the various ways in which the draft non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/192, 193) has been shaped to meet the requests and needs of the non-nuclear-weapon States. These requests and needs have been expressed in many ways but primarily in the joint memoranda of the non-aligned States (ENDC/158, 178) and in resolution 2028(XX) of the General Assembly (ENDC/161).
5. The requirement first listed by these documents is that the treaty should be devoid of loop-holes for proliferation. As the 1966 joint memorandum (ENDC/178) of the non-aligned States recognized, it was this requirement which imposed the most difficult task on the draftsmen. It was the difficulty of satisfying this requirement which held up agreement for so long. We submit that the draft now contains no loop-holes for proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form. No amount of argumentation about so-called "vertical non-proliferation" -- that is, halting the nuclear arms race -- can hide that fact.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

6. In order to avoid any loop-holes, the draft deals with other nuclear explosive devices just as it does with weapons. This represents no change in policy on our part from earlier United States drafts. We have always felt that nuclear explosive devices which could be used as nuclear weapons should be treated as such, and we so interpreted our earlier drafts. The change in language resulted because others made different interpretations. In any event it is absolutely clear that, if there are to be no loop-holes for the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the treaty cannot permit the proliferation of devices which could be used as nuclear weapons.
7. The second and third requirements or principles are balance and progress towards disarmament. They are usually dealt with together. I should like to begin my discussion of them by mentioning that nuclear-weapon States are already well ahead of the non-nuclear-weapon States as far as balance and progress towards disarmament are concerned. The test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) had a far greater impact on States which were developing nuclear weapons through atmospheric and space tests than it had on States which had never tested a nuclear weapon. The nuclear-weapon States had to inhibit weapon development in certain important areas. But they did not ask non-nuclear-weapon States to sign a non-proliferation pledge as a price for the signing of the test-ban Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States.
8. A similar point can be made about the outer space Treaty (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI)). The impact of its restrictions on nuclear-weapon States was much greater than on non-nuclear-weapon States.
9. Now I should like to list the responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear-weapon States which are embodied in the treaty. First, they may not transfer nuclear weapons, or control over them, to any recipient whatsoever. This we regard as a very significant obligation, going to the heart of the treaty. Assuming that no present nuclear-weapon State wishes to transfer such weapons, how can we be sure that this will remain true for ten, twenty or more years if there is no treaty? Whether we like it or not, history shows that weapon-manufacturing countries have almost always ended by selling last year's sophisticated weapons to other countries, whether the motive was supply of genuinely-needed military assistance, profit, expansion of influence, or fear that another weapons manufacturer would do so if they did not. If there is no treaty and additional States acquire nuclear weapons, their rivals and neighbours may well be prepared to pay a very high price, in one form or another, to acquire such weapons also.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

10. A related point can be made about the second principal obligation of nuclear-weapon States: that is, that they shall not assist non-nuclear-weapon States to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. For similar reasons this is also a very significant obligation.

11. Let me list, in addition, certain other responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States which are embodied in the draft. These "responsibilities", using one of the words of resolution 2028 (XX), must be weighed in the balance on the side of the nuclear-weapon States. These responsibilities include: (1) making available to all parties, for peaceful purposes, technological by-products which may be derived from the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (2) making available to non-nuclear-weapon parties potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions through appropriate international procedures on a non-discriminatory basis and at a charge for the devices which is as low as possible and excludes any charge for research and development; (3) achieving a cessation of the nuclear arms race at the earliest possible date; (4) taking steps to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles under an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

12. Two of these important responsibilities are stated in the treaty in the form of a declaration of intention. This was a form suggested by the 1966 joint memorandum. That memorandum, moreover, said that the non-proliferation treaty could be "coupled with or followed by" tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race, and to limit, reduce and eliminate nuclear stocks (ENDC/178, p. 3).

13. For reasons with which all the members of the Committee are familiar, the co-Chairmen were not able to couple such steps with the treaty. But we have embodied in the text a declaration of intention to halt the nuclear arms race. The text also contains a provision for a review conference to make more effective this and other statements of purpose. The idea of a review conference was also suggested by the 1966 joint memorandum.

14. We believe that the non-proliferation treaty will be a step towards general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament, which is all that resolution 2028 (XX) asks. Without a non-proliferation treaty, nuclear disarmament will become more and more difficult to achieve. In one of President Kennedy's last

(Mr. Foster, United States)

famous speeches, he said that in a world of ten or twenty nuclear Powers there would be "no stability, no real security, and no chance of effective disarmament".

(ENDC/102, p. 5) I think that all of us here probably agree. In this sense, a successful non-proliferation treaty would inevitably be a step towards effective nuclear disarmament.

15. Let me turn briefly to the requirement that the treaty should contain acceptable and workable provisions to ensure its effectiveness. Aside from the review conference which I have already mentioned, this means that an effective article on safeguards is essential to the treaty. We regret that no such article has yet been agreed, but we continue to believe that one is necessary.

16. The last requirement of resolution 2028 (XX) is directly embodied in the preamble to the treaty. This is the requirement that nothing in the treaty should adversely affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties, such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco (ENDC/186), in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons from their respective territories.

17. Finally, in their 1966 joint memorandum the eight delegations requested explicit statements concerning assistance to developing countries on atomic programmes for peaceful purposes. Later, several of the eight delegations suggested that the treaty should contain an article on the peaceful uses of atomic energy, as does the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Not only does the draft now contain such an article, but it also contains three preambular provisions relating to nuclear assistance and co-operation for peaceful purposes, including significant offers of co-operation to non-nuclear-weapon parties which have never been made before.

18. In this connexion the Nigerian representative suggested at our meeting of 31 August that, in addition to making available nuclear explosive services for peaceful purposes, the nuclear-weapon States should permit scientists from non-nuclear-weapon States to work in close collaboration with them in developing certain peaceful applications of nuclear explosions (ENDC/PV.327, para. 57). The United States is fully prepared to participate in arrangements for sharing, with scientists from non-nuclear-weapon countries adhering to the treaty, information on the technology of applying nuclear explosives to peaceful purposes. I discussed this in more detail on 8 June (ENDC/PV.303).

(Mr. Foster, United States)

19. The Committee may be interested in knowing of a current example of sharing technology in the field of peaceful nuclear explosives. Later this year, not long from now, Project Gasbuggy, a joint experiment of the United States Government and private industry, will be undertaken to determine whether nuclear explosives detonated deep underground can stimulate the production of natural gas. A technical symposium is planned to cover such topics as geology and hydrology, underground characteristics of the site, and field operations, including the dynamic effects of the explosion, measurements of dynamic effects, and safety. Plans are now being developed for technical experts from other countries to attend the symposium and to be present during the explosion.

20. At our last meeting the representative of Canada set forth some extremely interesting ideas on how the peaceful benefits of nuclear explosives might be made available through an international organization pursuant to a separate treaty or agreement (ENDC/PV.329, para. 22). My own Government has been giving a great deal of study to this very problem. We have transmitted Mr. Burns's helpful remarks to Washington with the request that they be given careful attention in this study.

21. I have described today the many ways in which the draft treaty has already been shaped and modified to meet the needs and requests of non-nuclear-weapon countries. I realize that delegations may differ in their judgements on this question. But I can assure all delegations that the co-Chairmen have done their utmost, within the inescapable limits of what is realistic and feasible, to comply with all the basic principles and requirements in the joint memoranda and in resolution 2028 (XX). In our view the draft does comply with these principles and requirements.

22. Now, in saying good-bye for myself and Mr. Bunn I should like to thank all the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for their kindness and co-operation in our work together here in Geneva. I wish also to thank the United Nations Secretariat and the interpreters and verbatim reporters who make these meetings possible. I shall follow the efforts here with very close attention from Washington, and I certainly hope they will meet with every possible success.



The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 330th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador V.C. Trivedi, representative of India.

"A statement was made by the representative of the United States.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 19 September 1967, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11 a.m.

